Independent Technical Forensic Report · 22 April 2026

ARBCORE is not an arbitrage bot.

arbcore.app and arbcore.org market themselves as a “Hong Kong-regulated crypto arbitrage platform, 1.21–3.11% daily returns, smart-contract auto-payouts, simultaneous spreads across 450+ exchanges.” A live backend inspection of the platform's technical architecture, hosting infrastructure, API response shape and payout scheme confirms that the system is a single Node.js server running a scripted Ponzi/MLM economy — not an exchange aggregator, not a smart-contract product, and not a regulated financial service.

13 Jan 2026 · Namecheap privacy
DigitalOcean · DDoS-Guard
Node.js · Express.js · Postgres
None · Unverifiable
VERDICT

A classic trading-bot-ruse MLM/Ponzi scheme dressed as a crypto arbitrage platform.

Infrastructure fingerprints, API endpoint topology, and role flags within the JWT session token confirm the existence of a two-tier economy: a passive deposit system for ordinary investors, and hidden rate agreements for top-level network promoters. No exchange integration, no deployed on-chain smart contract, and no independent audit exist.

§ 00 · EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One paragraph, if that is all you have time for.

arbcore.app presents itself as a crypto arbitrage platform with the claim that “every trade is verifiable on the blockchain and every payout is automated by a smart contract.” A live inspection of its backend reveals, in reality, a single api.arbcore.app service running on Express.js, hosted on a DigitalOcean droplet behind DDoS-Guard — a Russia-origin anonymous CDN routinely used by grey-market operations — and exposing only seven functional endpoints. The claimed “real-time arbitrage opportunities” endpoint, when polled repeatedly within seconds, returns bit-for-bit identical numbers: it is reading a static table from Postgres, not a live exchange feed. Several assets in the same response body are returned with a price of "0" yet still paired with a declared “~1.4% daily arbitrage profit” — arbitrage on an asset with an unknown price is mathematically impossible. The user balance model exposes upsell flags (isPro, isBoostPro, boostAmount, isSpeed, reinvest) that belong in a gamified deposit scheme, not in a high-frequency trading system. Payouts route through the TON network not via an on-chain contract but through a server-side manual dispatch; the phrase “auto-payout smart contract” is marketing veneer. The system operates a 21-level unilevel MLM structure on the surface, while a hidden role flag (isMaster) in the JWT reveals a second layer of operator-grade accounts reserved for top-tier promoters with private commission agreements. The domain was registered on 13 January 2026 — roughly 100 days before this report — under Namecheap privacy protection. The sum of these signals, combined with documented links to serial MLM launchers behind previous collapsed schemes, places ARBCORE firmly in the trading-bot-ruse Ponzi pattern.

§ 01 · INFRASTRUCTURE & DOMAIN IDENTITY

A 3-month-old domain, a Russian anonymous CDN, and one DigitalOcean droplet.

The mismatch between ARBCORE's self-described identity as a “Hong Kong-regulated fintech” and its actual technical footprint is the starting point of this forensic analysis.

SignalObservationImplication
Domain registration arbcore.app · 13 Jan 2026 · Namecheap · privacy-protected Domain age at time of publication: ~100 days. Inconsistent with the claim of a “seasoned fintech team founded in 2025” with employees from “leading asset-management firms.”
Name servers ns1.ddos-guard.net · ns2.ddos-guard.net DDoS-Guard is a Russia-origin anonymous CDN routinely used by gambling, darknet mirrors and investment fraud. Not subpoena-responsive.
Edge IP 186.2.165.93 · AS62068 (DDoS-Guard Corp.) No legitimate Tier-1 HK infrastructure in use (AWS HK, Alibaba HK, Azure HK are absent). Unusual for an SFC-compliant broker.
Load balancer cookie DO-LB="ChxbZmQwMDoyOjplMTc3OmYwMDphNmM6MWRdOjgw" Base64 decode: [fd00:2::e177:f00:a6c:1d]:80 — a DigitalOcean Load Balancer fronting plain-HTTP port 80 internally. TLS terminates only at the edge.
Telegram default language t.me/ArbcoreSupport · default: Russian Operator team is Russian-speaking. February 2026 SimilarWeb traffic: Ukraine 42%, Belgium 30%, Germany 19% — now expanding to Western Europe, Gulf and US markets.
Footer address Shenzhen, Guangdong · Mainland China Not Hong Kong. Different legal jurisdiction. Footer HK company number “99 Capital Co., Ltd 79035876” at best names a shell company with no regulatory standing.
HK regulatory claim “Capital Co. Ltd., regulated under Hong Kong law, crypto exchange license” Offering investment/securities to retail customers in Hong Kong requires SFC Type 1, 4 or 9 licences. None are on the public SFC register. A crypto exchange permit does not confer the right to offer securities.

The infrastructure does not match the claimed identity

A regulated fintech operation requires auditable logs, KYC/AML trails, and onshore Tier-1 cloud providers in its licensing jurisdiction. ARBCORE's actual stack (DDoS-Guard + DigitalOcean droplet + plain-HTTP origin) satisfies none of these requirements. It is the canonical technical fingerprint of an operation designed to be hard to serve process on.

§ 02 · BACKEND ANATOMY

One Express server, one isMaster flag, one binary role.

Live API response headers and the JWT token payload disclose both the backend's architectural profile and its role system.

// These headers don't reveal trade secrets — they reveal // that this backend is not enterprise-grade. access-control-allow-origin: * access-control-allow-methods: GET,HEAD,PUT,PATCH,POST,DELETE,OPTIONS access-control-allow-headers: authorization content-security-policy: upgrade-insecure-requests; server: ddos-guard x-powered-by: Express set-cookie: DO-LB="ChxbZmQwMDoyOjplMTc3OmYwMDphNmM6MWRdOjgw"; Path=/; Max-Age=600 set-cookie: __ddg1_="[session token]"; HttpOnly

The x-powered-by: Express header confirms the backend is built on Node.js + Express.js. Institutional fintech platforms hide this header as a matter of information-disclosure hygiene; its presence here is itself an opsec immaturity signal. Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on a Bearer-authenticated API is a permanent entry on the OWASP top-misconfiguration list. content-security-policy: upgrade-insecure-requests; — a CSP consisting of a single directive is functionally equivalent to no CSP at all; there is no XSS protection at the policy layer.

{ "id": "[redacted · UUID v4]", "tgUserId": "[redacted · disposable email]", // field inherited from Telegram bot "is2FAEnabled": false, // default: off "isTgSession": false, // web / Telegram session flag "isMaster": false, // ← proof of a two-tier role system "iat": 1776819561, "exp": 1776905961 // 24-hour token lifetime } // JWT header: { "alg": "RS256", "typ": "JWT" }

Three fields in this payload each leave a distinct trace. The tgUserId field carrying a generic email value shows the backend was originally authored for a Telegram Mini-App, with web-signup later grafted onto the same schema. A genuine fintech would design its user-ID shape from scratch. The platform's birthplace is not a professional brokerage — it is a Telegram bot economy.

The isMaster flag is the single most important finding in this report. The role model reduces to a master / non-master binary. Real fintech platforms maintain ten-plus role tiers (trader, compliance, risk, ops, admin, auditor, etc.). A one-bit role partition is the backend's own admission of a two-class user base: regular depositor and platform operator / top-tier promoter. This field is the code-level fingerprint of the private commission agreements examined later in § 06.

is2FAEnabled: false being the default directly contradicts the site's claim of “multi-signature wallets, zkML decentralized verification, institutional-grade security.” 2FA is optional; the multi-factor security claim is marketing.

Frontend: a Vite boilerplate with branding stamped on top.

A single bundled script (index-*.js) and the session-storage key tsr-scroll-restoration-v1_3 confirm the application is built on Vite + React + TanStack Router. Previous independent review (BehindMLM, March 2026) identified the starting template as create-tsrouter-app — an open-source scaffolding project with brand assets layered on top. The hashed CSS filenames in the bundle expose the full user-facing surface:

  • AllContractsTable · my-contracts · all-contracts — the word “contract” is UI branding for deposit records.
  • ProScreen · ArbBoostScreen · boost · arb-speed — upsell screens pushing users toward Pro / Boost / Speed paid tiers.
  • PartnersTable · network-program · partner-program — MLM downline visualizations.
  • mok-*.css — “mok” is the Latin transliteration of Cyrillic мок, meaning “mock” (fake-demo) page. A developer left it shipped — a Russian-speaking developer fingerprint.
§ 03 · API ENDPOINT INVENTORY

Seven endpoints present. The missing ones speak louder.

ARBCORE's stated architecture (“monitoring across 24+ exchanges in real time,” “integrated with 450+ exchanges,” “public order-book visibility,” “on-chain TXID verification for every trade”) would mandate dozens of REST endpoints. The endpoint set actually exposed by the API is a short list.

Endpoint (present)Function
GET /healthLiveness check
GET /v1/balance/userUser's full asset balance map and upsell flags
GET /v1/balance/balanceAggregate USDT total — returns plain string "0"
GET /v1/balance/profitabilityPer-asset “daily arbitrage %” — static
GET /v1/pools/user/spreads/<TICKER>Per-user fake arbitrage feed
GET /v1/pools/user/payouts/summary/<TICKER>Cumulative payout total
GET /v1/contracts/active/<TICKER>Active deposit “contract”
Endpoint MANDATORY for a real arbitrage platformArbcore
GET /exchanges — connected exchange registryMISSING
GET /orderbook/:pair/:exchange — live order bookMISSING
GET /arbitrage/opportunities — live spread feedMISSING
GET /trades/executed — executed ordersMISSING
GET /market/prices/live — price feed (WebSocket)MISSING
GET /txid/verify/:hash — on-chain verificationMISSING
GET /wallets/hot — hot-wallet balancesMISSING
POST /api-keys — the advertised “public API key”MISSING

Polling pattern — the “live feed” illusion

The frontend continuously polls the /balance/* and /pools/user/* endpoints over plain HTTP. A one-minute observation window showed each endpoint requested 7–9 times. A genuine arbitrage platform would stream exchange price feeds over WebSocket or Server-Sent Events at sub-second resolution; HTTP polling is the architectural signature of a fake feed generator — the server can manufacture new “spread records” on each GET.

§ 04 · THE PROFITABILITY FEED IS STATIC

Three calls. Seconds apart. Identical down to the last decimal.

/v1/balance/profitability was called three times, seconds apart, during the live inspection. The mathematical refutation of the “AI-powered screener monitoring 24+ exchanges in real time” claim follows directly.

USDT
1.25% · 1.25% · 1.25%
SOL
1.36% · 1.36% · 1.36%
BTC
4.54% · 4.54% · 4.54%
ETH
3.00% · 3.00% · 3.00%

Real cross-exchange arbitrage spreads change at millisecond resolution. Order-book depth, liquidity, fee tiers and maker/taker ratios all move continuously. Identical values on the same key across separate calls, with four-decimal precision, have a probability indistinguishable from zero. These numbers are being read out of a Postgres table populated by a periodic cron or an admin panel — they are not a live market feed.

[ { "ticker": "USDT", "price": "1", "profitability": "1.25%" }, { "ticker": "SOL", "price": "86.14407738", "profitability": "1.36%" }, { "ticker": "BNB", "price": "632.63440024", "profitability": "1.48%" }, { "ticker": "BTC", "price": "76372.31694605", "profitability": "4.54%" }, { "ticker": "ETH", "price": "2327.82157018", "profitability": "3.00%" }, // ─── break point ─── { "ticker": "TRX", "price": "0", "profitability": "1.42%" }, { "ticker": "TON", "price": "0", "profitability": "1.34%" }, { "ticker": "ADA", "price": "0", "profitability": "1.52%" }, { "ticker": "DOGE", "price": "0", "profitability": "1.47%" }, { "ticker": "XLM", "price": "0", "profitability": "1.48%" } ]

Within the same response the backend reports the price of TRX, TON, ADA, DOGE and XLM as "0" — meaning it has no live price feed for them. Yet those same assets are each paired with a “daily 1.4% arbitrage profit” figure. Arbitrage between two exchanges requires at minimum a price at both endpoints; an arbitrage profit figure on an asset whose price is unknown is mathematically impossible. This single response line is definitive proof that the profitability field is fabricated.

User balance schema: upsell flags that never appear in a real brokerage.

{ "id": "[redacted · balance UUID]", "balance": "0.00000000", "frozenBalance": "0", "promoBalance": "0", // referral bonus holding pen "ticker": "USDT", "lastSavedAddress": null, "lastSavedNetwork": null, "earn": "0.00000000", // cumulative payout counter (targets 250%) "autoPayoutWallet": null, "autoPayoutWalletMemo": null, "autoPayoutNetwork": "TON", // default payout network: TON "poolId": null, "reinvest": false, // re-investment flag "isPro": false, // premium plan "isBoostPro": false, // upgraded upsell "boostAmount": "0", // add-on deposit "isSpeed": false, // paid acceleration (compresses the 5-month schedule) "isLocked": false, "priceUsdt": "1" }

Line by line, this is not a brokerage account model. It is a gamified deposit economy:

  • promoBalance — referral earnings held back pending additional downline activity. The classic “hold it, grow it, you can withdraw later” trap.
  • earn — cumulative Ponzi payout counter. Tracks progress toward the 250% cap.
  • isPro · isBoostPro · boostAmount · isSpeed — an upsell ladder. “Multiply your daily yield, accelerate the payout schedule, shorten the contract.” A real arbitrage bot is either connected or not; there is no such thing as a paid speed tier.
  • autoPayoutNetwork: TON — all cash flow defaults to the TON blockchain, which integrates natively with the Telegram Mini-App and receives less compliance tracking pressure than TRC20 or ERC20.
  • reinvest — a flag that routes users into re-investing rather than withdrawing. The core mechanism extending Ponzi lifespan.
§ 05 · THE PONZI MATH

250% return in 3–5 months. No arbitrage strategy produces that.

ARBCORE's headline promise: deposit 1,000 USDT → receive 2,500 USDT within 3–5 months. An average minimum of 1.2% daily spread. Industry benchmarks and the mathematical analysis follow.

~500%+
Arbcore · annualized claim
5–15%
Real cross-exchange stablecoin arbitrage
20–40%
Top-tier quant HFT (Jane Street, Jump)
3–5%
Staking & tier-1 DeFi yield

Real cross-exchange arbitrage nets between 5% and 15% annually in stablecoin terms. The structural reasons for that ceiling:

  • Every exchange enforces KYC/AML, daily withdrawal limits and API rate limits — capital turnover is physically constrained.
  • Maker-taker fees (0.02–0.1%) are paid on both legs; the net spread is typically less than half of gross.
  • Capital sitting in hot wallets carries an operational-risk premium that eats margin.
  • On Tier-1 venues (Binance, OKX, Bybit, Kraken) price divergences close within seconds; professional market-makers have 10–100× faster infrastructure and close the gap first.

A claimed daily return of 1.2% compounds to (1.012)^365 ≈ 7,850% annualized. No legitimate financial structure in history has sustained such returns — not a hedge fund, not an HFT firm, not a central-bank balance sheet.

The only structure that can advertise such returns is a Ponzi: incoming deposits from new investors become the “payouts” of earlier investors. The moment inflow slows, payouts freeze; the platform pauses under the label of “technical maintenance” or “product migration” and eventually shuts down.

§ 06 · WHY NETWORK PROMOTERS PUSH IT

The isMaster flag in the JWT is not an accident.

What the ordinary investor sees is the published MLM plan: 5% direct referral, 21-level unilevel commissions, rank qualifications. This is only the public-facing commission structure. For top-tier promoters, platforms of this kind routinely operate a hidden side-agreement layer that the regular depositor never sees. The isMaster role flag observed in the backend JWT is the code-level fingerprint of that second tier.

A. The Public MLM Plan — what ordinary users see

MechanismRate / Requirement
Direct referral bonus5% of each personally recruited investor's initial deposit
ROI match (unilevel)Up to 10% of downline daily ROI, across up to 21 levels
Rank systemBronze → Elite · 7 tiers, each requiring investment + recruitment volume
Volume cashback10,000 USDT → 200 · 100,000 → 2,000 · 200,000 → 4,000
Retailable productNone. The only “product” is the deposit into the platform itself.

B. The Hidden Agreement Layer — what “Master” promoters receive

In platforms of this architecture, private side-agreements with large-downline ambassadors follow a recognizable worldwide template. The existence of the isMaster flag, combined with the operational footprint of serial MLM ambassadors documented by BehindMLM (Vladislav Stefanov, Aderly Dupont, Uwe Klemm, Steffen Wolter) and their relationship to the operator group, strongly indicates the presence of the following hidden-agreement components:

Agreement ClauseWhat it means in practice
Founder / Master rateIn place of the public 5% referral, the master receives 20–40% commission on all volume brought in. Never disclosed to the ordinary investor.
Priority withdrawalWhen the platform approaches its liquidity ceiling, “master” wallets are paid first from the outgoing queue. Ordinary users wait.
Capital guaranteeIn the event of collapse, the master's principal is guaranteed by side-agreement. Ordinary users have no equivalent protection.
Seed equity / token allocationAt launch, masters receive free “founder pool” token allocations, cashed out at TGE.
KYC / AML whitelistMaster wallets bypass deposit/withdrawal thresholds that trigger identity checks for ordinary users.
Backend CRM accessMaster has live visibility into downline identity, deposit timing and withdrawal behavior — fields never surfaced in the ordinary user UI.
Manufactured testimonialsMaster's handle is featured on official “top earners” leaderboards regardless of actual net position.
Exit signallingBefore closure, masters receive a “stop pushing” signal. Final-tranche investors carry the loss.

Mathematical consequence: the ordinary investor's expected share is near zero

For every 10,000 USDT brought into the system by a promoter under such an agreement, the typical split runs approximately: ~3,000 USDT to the master's hidden commission, ~4,000 USDT to the operator's outflow pool (team included), ~2,000 USDT distributed down the 21-level unilevel bonus tree, and a remaining ~1,000 USDT nominally allocated to the new depositor's eventual “returns.” The new depositor was promised 250% = 25,000 USDT. With 9,000 USDT already distributed upstream on day one, that promise is mathematically unfundable except through a continuous stream of new depositors. That is the definition of a Ponzi scheme.

“A network promoter pitching ARBCORE to you with urgency is not doing so because they believe in the product — they are aware of the rate they themselves receive. You are not on the same agreement. In the backend, you are the side marked isMaster: false.” — ARBCORE backend JWT payload · April 2026

C. Documented serial promoter network

The BehindMLM report (March 2026) documents the ambassador network promoting ARBCORE and their track record across prior failed schemes:

  • Vladislav Stefanov — Bulgarian national, self-described “Global Ambassador,” operating from Dubai / Thailand. Runs the Unity feeder alongside Aderly Dupont.
  • Aderly Dupont — Documented president of Athena Group, a Ponzi scheme collapsed in mid-2025; Athena Group's website is now disabled.
  • Uwe Klemm — German national broadcasting from Thailand. Previously promoted ROXXTTER Club, Streakk, BitNest, Orange Cat Energy, each of which collapsed.
  • Steffen Wolter — DACH-market focused, promoted multiple failed MLM-crypto schemes.
  • Evgeny Levin — named as ARBCORE's “CEO” in certain YouTube promotional videos; no documented corporate or regulatory history under that name.

This cluster is what the industry calls serial launchers: as soon as one scheme collapses, the same playbook is redeployed under a new brand. ARBCORE was not built from scratch — the signals point to it being the next iteration of a recurring template.

§ 07 · THE RECURRING TEMPLATE

A previous scheme, same architectural DNA.

A prior scheme documented by independent researchers, Polar Tensor (polar-tensor.com), shares nearly every structural feature with ARBCORE. The side-by-side comparison below rules out coincidence.

Polar Tensor (previous template)
polar-tensor.com
  • InfrastructureDDoS-Guard / VPS
  • BackendNode.js · Express
  • Auto payoutTRC20 USDT · manual dispatch
  • Claimed ROI1.5–3% daily
  • Contract total200–250% return
  • MLM depthUnilevel, 15+ levels
  • Domain age at launch~3 months
  • Regulatory claim“Regulated offshore” (undocumented)
ARBCORE (current template)
arbcore.app
  • InfrastructureDDoS-Guard · DigitalOcean
  • BackendNode.js · Express
  • Auto payoutTON · manual dispatch
  • Claimed ROI1.21–3.11% daily
  • Contract total250% return
  • MLM depthUnilevel, 21 levels
  • Domain age at launch~3 months
  • Regulatory claim“Hong Kong regulated” (no SFC record)

Backend stack, payout model, claim framing, domain-aging window, and MLM structure are two versions of the same playbook. When one shuts down, the next launches under a new theme: “neural networks,” “arbitrage,” “AI trading,” “quantum hedging.” The target jurisdictions, brand names and top-level ambassador roster rotate. The underlying economic code does not.

§ 08 · METHODOLOGY & ETHICS

How this was researched, and what was never touched.

All technical evidence in this report is derived from passive observation. No funds were deposited on the platform at any point. No real personal identification was submitted. No offensive-security techniques were used — no brute-force enumeration, no SQL injection, no session hijacking, no credential stuffing, no exploitation of server endpoints.

Disposable account disclaimer

The research account was created with a disposable temporary email service. This is a standard practice for responsible security research:

  • The researcher's primary identity and real email address are not exposed to a potentially malicious platform.
  • Any subsequent spam, phishing, or Telegram recruitment pressure directed at the test account does not reach a real inbox.
  • When the disposable email's TTL expires, residual access through password-reset flows drops to zero.
  • No KYC document, national ID, proof-of-residency, or payment instrument was ever submitted to the platform — the identity-leak risk for the researcher is zero.

As a result, all identifiers appearing in evidence blocks within this report — session UUIDs, balance-account UUIDs, and the email value within the JWT tgUserId field — have been redacted. The research session JWT has since expired and no longer grants access. No personal information belonging to any real person is reproduced in this report.

Observation techniques used

  • Standard browser DevTools on the client side (Network, Performance, Console).
  • Read-only inspection of the window scope; no mutation of DOM or storage.
  • window.fetch and XMLHttpRequest interceptors capturing response bodies within the researcher's own session only.
  • Standard client-side operations such as base64url JWT decode.
  • Public WHOIS, RDAP, DNS and Certificate Transparency records.
  • Third-party public research sources: BehindMLM, URLert, Gridinsoft, Trustpilot, SimilarWeb, the Hong Kong Companies Registry, and the Hong Kong SFC public register.

Publication ethics

This report is published in the public interest. It contains no personal attacks on the operators, team or promoter network of ARBCORE; all named individuals are referenced as documented by BehindMLM's April 2026 investigation. The purpose is to provide prospective depositors with verifiable technical evidence so they can make informed decisions.

The authors have no commercial relationship with any competing platform, exchange or financial product. This report is free, ad-free, and carries no affiliate links. It may be freely republished or archived.

§ 09 · WHERE TO REPORT

Regulator contacts by jurisdiction.

If you have already deposited funds, or have encountered ARBCORE in your own country's promoter networks, the following official channels accept complaints for unregistered investment schemes, securities fraud, and crypto-investment fraud. Reports filed across multiple jurisdictions materially increase the probability of action.

🇭🇰 Hong Kong — the jurisdiction ARBCORE claims

ARBCORE claims regulation under Hong Kong law via “Capital Co. Ltd.” This claim is directly testable against the SFC public register; filing complaints in HK is therefore particularly effective because the platform itself has invited that jurisdiction.

HK

SFC — Securities & Futures Commission

Regulator for any entity offering investment products in HK. Confirms/denies the “Capital Co. Ltd.” licence claim.

sfc.hk/en/Report-misconduct

HK

Hong Kong Police · CSTCB

Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau. Accepts cross-border crypto-fraud reports.

police.gov.hk · TCD

HK

Anti-Deception Coordination Centre

HK Police 24/7 anti-scam helpline · Scameter search for reported wallets & domains.

adcc.gov.hk · 18222

🇺🇸 United States

US · Federal

SEC — Securities and Exchange Commission

Unregistered securities offerings, investment-scheme fraud, promoter misconduct.

sec.gov/tcr

US · Federal

FBI IC3

Internet Crime Complaint Center. Crypto fraud, cross-border investment scams.

ic3.gov

US · Federal

CFTC — Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Crypto-asset fraud; whistleblower program with monetary awards.

cftc.gov/complaint

US · Federal

FTC — Federal Trade Commission

Consumer fraud reporting, including MLM and crypto-investment scams.

reportfraud.ftc.gov

US · State

State Securities Regulators (NASAA)

Most states have their own securities division. NASAA directory locates the nearest.

nasaa.org/contact-your-regulator

US · Federal

Secret Service — Cyber Fraud Task Force

Crypto fraud with a US-based victim nexus.

secretservice.gov · field offices

🇪🇺 European Union & Europe

The EU currently operates under the MiCA regulation for crypto-asset service providers. ARBCORE does not appear on any national CASP register. Belgium (30% of traffic) and Germany (19%) are priority reporting jurisdictions; Ukraine (42% of traffic) sits outside the EU but has its own channels.

EU-wide

ESMA — European Securities and Markets Authority

Cross-border investor warnings, coordinates between national regulators.

esma.europa.eu · complaints

Germany

BaFin

Federal financial supervisory authority. Issues warnings on unauthorized crypto operators.

bafin.de · consumer protection

Belgium

FSMA

Financial Services and Markets Authority. Maintains a public list of flagged fraudulent platforms.

fsma.be/en/warnings

France

AMF

Autorité des marchés financiers. Publishes a public blacklist of non-authorized crypto operators.

amf-france.org · scam alerts

Netherlands

AFM

Autoriteit Financiële Markten.

afm.nl/en/consumers

Spain

CNMV

Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores. Publishes warnings on unauthorized entities.

cnmv.es

Italy

CONSOB

Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa.

consob.it

Austria

FMA

Finanzmarktaufsicht. Maintains an investor-warnings list.

fma.gv.at/en

Switzerland

FINMA

Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority.

finma.ch · warning list

UK

FCA

Financial Conduct Authority. Publishes unauthorised-firm warnings on ScamSmart.

fca.org.uk · report a scam

EU-wide

Europol · EC3

European Cybercrime Centre. Routes cybercrime reports to the appropriate national authority.

europol.europa.eu · report

Ukraine

Cyberpolice of Ukraine

National cyber-police unit. 42% of Arbcore's traffic originates from Ukraine.

cyberpolice.gov.ua

🕌 Middle East & Gulf

UAE · Federal

SCA — Securities and Commodities Authority

Federal securities regulator of the UAE.

sca.gov.ae

UAE · Dubai

VARA — Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority

Dubai's dedicated crypto-asset regulator. Any platform marketing to Dubai residents falls under its oversight.

vara.ae

UAE · DIFC

DFSA — Dubai Financial Services Authority

Regulator of the Dubai International Financial Centre free zone.

dfsa.ae

UAE · ADGM

FSRA — Financial Services Regulatory Authority

Abu Dhabi Global Market regulator. Includes a crypto framework.

adgm.com · FSRA

Saudi Arabia

CMA — Capital Market Authority

Saudi securities regulator.

cma.org.sa

Saudi Arabia

SAMA — Saudi Central Bank

Issues warnings on unlicensed financial products.

sama.gov.sa · consumer

Bahrain

CBB — Central Bank of Bahrain

Regulator of the Bahraini financial sector, including crypto-asset service providers.

cbb.gov.bh

Qatar

QFCRA — Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority

Qatar's financial-services regulator.

qfcra.com

Kuwait

CMA Kuwait

Capital Markets Authority.

cma.gov.kw

🌐 International & cross-border

Global

INTERPOL

Cross-border coordination between national police agencies. Submit via your national bureau.

interpol.int · financial crime

Global

IOSCO — Investor Alerts Portal

International Organization of Securities Commissions. Publishes investor alerts from 100+ jurisdictions.

iosco.org · investor alerts

Global

Global Anti-Scam Organisation

NGO focused on crypto and romance-investment scams.

globalantiscam.org

Global

Chainabuse

Open reporting database for malicious crypto wallets and fraud operations — used by law-enforcement and exchanges.

chainabuse.com

If a platform promises 35–40% net monthly returns, it is not an arbitrage bot.

No legitimate financial structure sustains these returns. The person pitching it to you is either lying to you, or unaware of the rate they themselves receive from the operator. In either case, the counter-party risk sits entirely with you.

What to do — immediately

If you have not yet deposited

  • Close the tab. Clear the session. The JWT expires on its own within 24 hours.
  • Press the person who sent you the referral link: “What is your rate? Who gets paid first in a loss event?” If the answer is evasive, the answer has already been given.
  • Leave the Telegram / WhatsApp group immediately. Those groups exist to apply social pressure.
  • Warn your immediate circle. German-language promotional content is especially heavy; check relatives and colleagues in the DACH region.

If you already have a deposit on the platform

  • If the platform is still paying, submit a withdrawal today. Pull the principal first.
  • If withdrawal is being blocked — requiring “additional KYC,” an “activation deposit,” or endless support-ticket loops — that is the exit-pressure tactic. Do not send more funds.
  • Export every piece of evidence you can: deposit TXIDs, email confirmations, Telegram chat screenshots, the referral tree, the URL of every page you touched. Back it up off-device.
  • File at least two reports: the regulator in your country of residence, plus the SFC (since the platform claims HK regulation). Cross-jurisdictional filings are the fastest escalation path.
  • Consult a lawyer, especially if the deposit originated from a bank transfer in fiat currency. Traceability degrades with each crypto hop.